Fusing restricted information by Jändel, Magnus et al.
Fusing restricted information 
 
Magnus Jändel, Pontus Svenson, Ronnie Johansson   
Division of Information and Aeronautical Systems 
FOI Swedish Defence Research Agency 
Stockholm, Sweden 
firstname.lastname@foi.se 
 
 
Abstract—Information fusion deals with the integration and 
merging of data and information from multiple (heterogeneous) 
sources. In many cases, the information that needs to be fused 
has security classification. The result of the fusion process is then 
by necessity restricted with the strictest information security 
classification of the inputs.  This has severe drawbacks and limits 
the possible dissemination of the fusion results.  It leads to 
decreased situational awareness: the organization knows 
information that would enable a better situation picture, but 
since parts of the information is restricted, it is not possible to 
distribute the most correct situational information.  
     In this paper, we take steps towards defining fusion and data 
mining processes that can be used even when all the underlying 
data that was used cannot be disseminated. The method we 
propose here could be used to produce a classifier where all the 
sensitive information has been removed and where it can be 
shown that an antagonist cannot even in principle obtain 
knowledge about the classified information by using the classifier 
or situation picture.  
Keywords—privacy preserving data mining, secrecy preserving 
fusion, classification,data mining, component;   
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Information fusion deals with the integration and merging 
of data and information from multiple (heterogeneous) sources. 
Most fusion research deals with new algorithms for merging 
information or describes systems that solve fusion problems in 
a specific setting. Fusion is about helping decision makers or 
analysts increase their situational awareness by reducing 
uncertainty or information content.  
In many cases, the information that needs to be fused has a 
security classification. The result of the fusion process is then 
by necessity restricted with the strictest information security 
classification of the inputs.  This has severe drawbacks and 
limits the possible dissemination of the fusion results.  It leads 
to decreased situational awareness: the organization knows 
information that would enable a better situation picture, but 
since parts of the information is restricted, it is not possible to 
distribute the most correct situational information. Instead, 
many users must use situation information that the organization 
knows to be incorrect.  
Some example application use cases where it is necessary 
to fuse restricted information are: 
• intelligence analysis, where for instance concerns 
about the security of a source might lead to the 
situational picture not being updated. For instance, it 
might be the case that a highly placed human source 
gives detailed information (referred to as HUMINT for 
human intelligence) about, e.g., the order of battle that 
when combined with input from sensors could be used 
to determine what type of units are being deployed in a 
foreign country. However, the fusion system available 
to country analysts is not able to use the HUMINT 
information, since that could potentially reveal the 
source. All the information is only available to, e.g., 
the commander in chief. By developing methods for 
secrecy-preserving information fusion, it could be 
possible to at least give some information to the low 
level commanders, with a guarantee that this will not 
reveal the source. 
• classification and screening tasks, where it, for ethical 
and privacy reasons, is not permitted to give all users 
of a classification algorithm detailed knowledge about 
the data. In a peace-keeping mission it might for 
example be of interest to fuse military intelligence data 
with local police records and a database of registered 
voters in a recent general election. The voter 
registration data includes, however, religious affiliation 
which local authorities, for ethical reasons, are 
reluctant to share with the peace-keeping force.  
• there might be restrictions in what kind of information 
can be sent over a communication line or given to an 
expeditionary force. Concerns about the integrity of the 
communication lines and fear of losing databases to 
attacks today prevent some information from being 
shared with national intelligence cells in countries 
where a force is conducting a peace-enforcing 
operation. Secrecy-preserving fusion would make it 
possible to share more information with local 
intelligence cells. 
Figure 1 below attempts to show the fusion use case. In this 
simplified example, one user (right) has access to all three 
sources and can confirm what kind of object is being seen. 
The other user (left) is not allowed access to the sensitive 
signature database at all and thus cannot identify a certain 
object. In this paper, we take a first step towards developing 
a method for allowing the user to get more fine-grained 
access to the data in the sensitive database, thus enabling 
better identification. 
The approach could be compared to object-based security. In 
Object-based security, the classification of a document 
determines who can access it, not the datab
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 classifier then consists of the 
1. Build a classifier 
2. Filter out sensitive information (this step might 
include building new classifiers on subsets of the 
available information or modifying the classifier 
from step 1 so that no sensitive information is 
revealed) 
3. Fuse information 
where the last element only applies if we have several source 
databases to consider. Different permutations of these process 
elements make for different algorithmic problems to consider. 
Restricting the discussion to one single database we have the 
permutations Filter →Build and Build→Filter, where the 
former was briefly discussed in the previous sub-section. With 
several databases and taking into account that the same 
process does not have to be applied to all databases, we have a 
large number of possible permutations as illustrated in Figure 
2 in which we have applied the rules that fusion, filtering and 
building is applied only once to a given artifact. Even with this 
somewhat limiting assumption we note that there is a plethora 
of possible algorithm architectures even if we only consider a 
few databases. 
 
 
 
     In the case of three databases, we encounter processes 
corresponding to more complex permutations some of which 
are illustrated in Figure 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      To enable easy reference to the various configurations in 
Figure 2 and Figure 3, we need a language similar to chemical 
formulas for describing molecules. Our atoms are the 
operations build (B), filter (E) and fuse (F) where we use the 
symbol E for filter to avoid symbol collisions and with the 
mnemonic that filtering is a form of editing. Note that the 
filtering operator E is overloaded since it can apply to a 
database or a classifier depending on the context. Each process 
formula describes the operators that are applied to the 
databases in temporal order from the right to the left in the 
formula using the function composition symbol ◦ to separate 
operators that are applied to the same database and the symbol 
x to separate groups of operators that are applied to different 
databases. Hence ◦ indicates serial processing while x means 
parallel processing. In this notation the two options for 
processing a single database is E◦B and B◦E where the former 
indicates that we first build a classifier and subsequently filter 
the restricted information from the classifier. The eight options 
for processing two databases (see Figure 2 in the order left to 
right and top to bottom) B◦E◦F, E◦B◦F, E◦F◦(B×B), 
B◦F◦(E×E), F◦(B×B)◦(E×E), F◦(B×E)◦(E×B), 
F◦(E×B)◦(B×E) and  F◦(E×E)◦(B×B). Similarly we can write 
the two configurations in Figure 3 (right to left) as  
F◦(B◦E◦F) × (B◦E) and F◦(E◦F◦(B×B)) × (B◦E) respectively. 
 
      If we want to express how the processes are applied to 
specific databases we can specify the sensitivity descriptors 
that the processes operate on. For example, 
F◦(E×B)◦(B×E){DB1; DB2} , where we apply the convention 
that parallel operators are applied in left-right order to the 
arguments, means that DB2 is filtered before the classifier is 
built while the opposite applies to DB1. 
 
 Note that this notation is not restricted to only being used 
for describing sensitive operations. It can be used to define any 
distributed fusion process. For instance, Bowman has 
introduced the Dual node network (DNN) to decompose 
 
Figure 3 - Showing examples of build/filter/fuse permutations 
for three input databases with symbols as in Fig. 1. The source 
databases are included for greater clarity. 
 
 
Figure 2 - Showing all eight possible build/filter/fuse 
permutations for two input databases. Triangle means fuse, 
rectangle means filter and oval means build classifier 
(unintentionally this produces rather strange looking face-like 
forms) 
complex fusion processes into a network of interconnected 
fusion nodes [2]. The approach we propose here could be used 
also to describe DNNs. 
While the discussion in this paper focuses on classifiers, the 
extension to fusion algorithms in general is straightforward. A 
sensor can be seen as a database [3]. The build step 
corresponds to constructing situation information. The 
resulting situation information elements are then used to 
answer queries from the decision makers. The confidential 
information that we wish to preserve must be hidden from 
these users – they must not be able to infer restricted 
information from the situation picture. 
A concrete example could be that we have access to a new, 
advanced sensor that is able to collect multi-spectral 
information. The fact that we have such a sensor is classified 
and only high-level commanders are allowed to see the 
information from it. The secrecy-preserving problem is to 
determine what results from the sensor that we can fuse with 
other information and send to low-level commanders, without 
them (or an adversary) being able to infer that we have access 
to the new sensor. A more traditional example is that we have a 
human source whose existence must not be revealed. The 
secrecy-preserving fusion problem is to fuse the information 
from the secret agent with other sources and then weaken the 
situation picture information enough so that the source is not 
revealed. 
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION 
 
A database (DB) includes both sensitive information (SI) 
and open information (OI). What is sensitive and not depends 
on the objectives and knowledge of the adversary and on what 
kind of security breaches that will be realized if the adversary 
gains access to the sensitive data. In the following we will 
always keep in mind that the term sensitive data is always 
construed in the context of a specific adversarial scenario.  
 
In our example with the peace-keeping force that wants to 
fuse intelligence data with local police records and a voting 
database, consider for example that the de-identified voting 
database is turned over to the police to be fused with police 
information, filtered and then passed on to the peace-keeping 
force. A local police officer could easily pin-point the exact 
identity of a villager based only on religious affiliation, gender 
and age while a peace-keeping intelligence officer without 
local information on who is practicing what religion would be 
unable to re-identify the same person.  
A. Stakeholders and trust relations 
 There are four types of stakeholders, 
1) The database owner (DBO) 
2) The classifier producer (CLP) 
3) The Certifier (CTF) 
4) The user of the classifier (CLU) 
The CLP builds the classifier using data provided by the DBO. 
The CTF represents the primary stakeholders in the integrity 
of the sensitive data and approves or rejects the release of the 
classifier to the CLU.  
 
There are three essential pieces of information that the 
stakeholders may be trusted or not trusted to have access to, 
 
1) The sensitive information in the database (SI) 
2) The source code of the classifier (CL-WB, for 
classifier white-box) 
3) The object code of the classifier (CL-BB, for 
classifier black-box) 
 
We realize that the definition of object code is not clear-
cut but use this term under the simplifying assumption that the 
user only has access to the input and outputs of object code 
but not to its internal structure. The source code is a white box 
and the object code is a black box view of the classifier. 
Having access to the source code including the learning state 
of the classifier is more or less useful depending on the type of 
algorithm employed. 
 
Table 1 maps out the possible trust relations between the 
respect to the four stakeholders and the three information 
artifacts. We assume that all stakeholders are trusted with the 
open data. In Table 1, the symbol T means that the stakeholder 
must be trusted with the information object whereas the blank 
field means that we have choice on whether or not to trust the 
stakeholder with the information. 
 
 
Table 1. Trust relations for different stakeholders. See text. 
Stakeholder SI CL-BB CL-WB 
DBO T   
CLP  T T 
CTF T T T 
CLU  T  
(Note: any stakeholder who has access to the CL-WB also has 
access to the CL-BB. However, the converse is not true. It 
might also be the case that there are several layers of SI, where 
the CLU has access to some of them but not all.) 
  
     Different technical solutions apply depending on how we 
fill in the blank fields of table 1. Consider for example a case in 
which the CLP is not trusted with the sensitive information. In 
that case the only option will be to let the DBO extract the open 
information and provide to the CLP. The CTF should verify 
that the filtered database in fact does not include any sensitive 
data but there is no need to certify the classifier since it only is 
based on the open information. This scenario is strongly related 
to the task of anonymizing a database according to techniques 
described in [4]. A systematic approach to the certification 
process is described in [5]. 
    Things get more interesting if we consider the case where 
the classifier producer (CLP) is allowed access to the sensitive 
information but the user of the classifier (CLU) is not. This is 
the main motivating example for the method proposed in the 
paper. In this case, the producer (CLP) must make sure that all 
remnants of sensitive information (SI) is removed from the 
classifier before it is submitted to the CLU for use. The 
certifier must verify this, and hence also requires access to the 
SI. This use case directly relates to the motivating examples 
given in section I and at the end of section III. In all these 
examples, the user of the fusion system (classifier) is not 
allowed un-restricted access to all information. Hence there is a 
need to make the classifier/fusion system weaker than it could 
be, in order to ensure that no secret information can be revealed 
by applying it to new data. 
B. Sensitivity descriptors 
Sensitive information may be isolated to one database or 
depend on correlations between several databases. To 
compactly capture the sensitivity situation we introduce 
sensitivity descriptors where the relevant databases and their 
sensitivity relations are listed. Sensitivity descriptor S1={DB1; 
DB2} means for example that both databases have sensitive 
information but that the sensitive information is uncorrelated 
between the two databases. The descriptor S2={DB1;[DB1, 
DB2]} means that DB1 has individual sensitive information 
and that there also is sensitive information that depends on 
correlations between DB1 and DB2. A sensitivity descriptor 
consists in general of a series of correlation descriptors 
separated by semicolons.  Each correlation descriptor is a set 
of database symbols separated by commas indicating that 
sensitive information depend on correlations between the 
databases in the list. 
 
      We are now in the position to compactly describe what 
processes that work for which sensitivity configurations. As an 
example, consider the sensitivity descriptor S3={[DB1, DB2]}. 
We note that the correlated sensitivity can only be handled if 
we fuse before we filter. 
 
So the only workable processing configurations are:   
• B◦E◦F,  
• E◦B◦F,  
• E◦F◦(B×B)  
 
The other possibilities are not allowed: 
• B◦F◦(E×E),  
• F◦(B×B)◦(E×E),  
• F◦(B×E)◦(E×B),  
• F◦(E×B)◦(B×E) 
• F◦(E×E)◦(B×B)  
 
The process by which we derived the workable processing 
configurations can be automated. Given a set of candidate 
configurations and the sensitivity descriptor, the 
configurations can be filtered until only the allowed ones 
remain. 
 
For more complex sensitivity configurations we can apply 
similar rules. It is for example easy to see that the sensitivity 
situation described by descriptor S4={[DB1, DB2]; DB3} is 
handled by the process F◦(B◦E◦F)×(E◦B). 
IV. FILTERING OF SENSITIVE INFORMATION 
We now proceed to describe a way to actually generate the 
allowed fusion processes. We will make use of formal 
languages and automata theory for doing this.  
A. Automata theory and grammars as a way of delimiting the 
allowed fusion structures 
The problem we are looking at in this section is: can we 
find a succinct characterization of the allowed fusion 
processed that takes the form of an automaton/language? We 
solve this by using context-sensitive grammars [6]. 
 
If we are able to further characterize desirable fusion 
structures in terms of additional constraints on the language 
generated, we could exploit this in two ways 
1. generating all possible allowed fusion structures in a 
simple way by simply applying the production rules. 
This would also give us a distance in the space of all 
allowed fusion structures (the distance measure 
would be the hierarchical distance between two 
structures: the distance to the latest common ancestor 
word) 
2. possibly use techniques from automata theory to 
analyse different fusion structures and determine 
what additional properties they would have.  
 
This approach is not limited to the current problem but 
could actually be a general method for analyzing distributed 
fusion systems. In addition to the security properties, also 
issues relating to information pedigree and credibility and 
reliability of the information could be analyzed in this way.  
B. Filtering schemas 
As preparation for defining a formal method for 
transforming a sensitivity descriptor to a process finite 
automata, we define filtering schemas for describing the 
temporal order of the filtering operations. The filtering 
schemas will serve as skeletons for building finite automata.  
 
      To be more specific about the effect of a filtering 
operation we introduce an argument that specifies what 
databases that are effected and what kind of sensitivities that 
are removed by the operation. The argument employs the 
same kind of notation as in the sensitivity descriptor but refers 
only to indices of databases. The filter E(1) removes the 
sensitive information from the database DB1. The filter 
E([1,2]) removes the correlated sensitive information from 
databases DB1 and DB2 but not uncorrelated sensitive 
information from any of DB1 and DB2. A filtering schema is a 
sequence of filtering operations as for example E(1) E([1,2]) 
meaning that we first remove the correlated sensitive 
information from DB1 and DB2 and subsequently remove the 
sensitive information from DB1 .  We can merge filtering 
operators as for example in E(1) E([1,2]) →E(1;[1,2]). The 
arrow indicates transformation from one schema to another 
(and not equality). The schema E(1;[1,2]) means that the 
individual sensitivity of DB1 is removed in the same atomic 
filtering process as the correlated sensitivity in DB1 and DB2.      
The information may be removed from the databases or from 
classifiers that are trained on the databases. The filtering 
schema is just a plan for the temporal order of the filtering and 
does not specify the targets of the filtering operations or any 
other details of the process.  
 
       Using this extended notation for filtering operations we 
can now define a simple algebra for the temporal ordering of 
filtering that is best described by a few examples. 
 
E(2)E(1){DB1; DB2} → E(2) {DB2}→{}. 
E([1,2])E(1){DB1; [DB1, DB2]}→ E([1,2]){[DB1, DB2]}→{}. 
E(1)E([1,2]) {DB1; [DB1, DB2]}→E(1){DB1}→{}. 
E(1, [1,2]) {DB1; [DB1, DB2]} →{}. 
 
A sequence of filters that transforms a sensitivity descriptor to 
the null descriptor {} is a filtering schema of the descriptor. 
C. Generating sensitivity descriptors using context sensitive 
grammars 
In this section we give an example of how the sensitivity 
descriptors can be generated using context sensitive grammars 
(CSG) [6]. We first look at the case of two databases. 
 
1) Two databases 
For two databases there are eight sensitivity descriptors 
S1={}, S2={DB1}, S3={DB2}, S4={DB1; DB2}, S5={[DB1, 
DB2]}, S6={DB1; [DB1, DB2]}, S7={DB2;[DB1, DB2]} and 
S8={DB1; DB2;[DB1, DB2]} where S1 means that there are no 
sensitive information in any of the databases S2 means that 
there are sensitive information in DB1 but not in DB2 and S4 
means that there are sensitive information in both DB1 and 
DB2 but that there are now correlation between the 
sensitivities of the databases.  
 
      In this section we define a CSG that generates these 
sensitivity descriptors and nothing else. In the resulting 
language we want to avoid duplicates due to permutations and 
get the symbols in lexicographic order. The CSG is defined as 
follows. 
 
The variables are 1d1,  1d2, 2d1  
The terminals are DB1,  DB2, {,  },  [,  ],  ;   
S is the start symbol 
 
     The production rules are, 
S → {} 
{} → {kdi}    where k=1,2 and i=1,2 
kdi} →  kdi;  k´di´ }    where k´≥k and i´>i if k´=k 
1di → DBi 
2d1 → [DB1, DB2] 
 
2) Arbitrary number of databases m 
     For the set of all possible duplicate-free and 
lexicographically ordered sensitivity descriptors for m 
databases is generated by the following CSG. 
 
     The variables are all symbols kdi where k=1, 2, … m and i = 
1,2, … Amk  in which Amm =  1 and Amk = m(m-1)(m-2)…(k+1).  
The terminals are DB1,  DB2, … DBm , {,  },  [,  ],  ;  . 
S is the start symbol. 
  
    The production rules are, 
S → {} 
{} → {kdi}    where k and i take any allowed values 
kdi} →  kdi;  k´di´ }    where k´≥k and i´>i if k´=k 
1di → DBi 
2di → [DBa, DBb] where a and b are defined by some 
lexicographic order over the Am2 possible sensitivity 
descriptors with two databases. 
kdi → [DBa, DBb, … DBq] where k indexes a,  b, … q 
are defined by some lexicographic order over the Amk 
possible sensitivity descriptors with k databases. 
 
D. Building process finite automata from filtering schemas 
Given a filtering schemas for a given sensitivity descriptor 
we are now ready for fleshing out the details of the related 
finite automaton. Figure 4 provides an example of how the 
filtering schema E(1)E([1,2]) for the sensitivity descriptor 
{DB1; [DB1, DB2]} translates to a finite automaton. We note 
that the automaton is modular with one component for each 
filtering operator. In Figure 4 we introduce a null action T for 
marking the transition from the clean final state of one 
component to the initial state of the next component.  
 
 
DB1 DB´1
C1C´1
E(1)
E(1)
BB
[DB1, DB2] DB1+2
C1+2C´1+2
E([1,2])
F
E([1,2])
B2
DB´1+2[C1, C2]
B
B
F
T
 
Figure 4 - The processing finite automaton based on the filtering 
schema E(1)E([1,2]). Note that the initial state is DB1 because E(1) 
comes first in the filtering schema. 
In general we can build any process finite automaton by 
matching the filter operators of the filtering schema to 
automata components in a process library. 
V. ACTOR TRUST AND COMPETENCE CONSTRAINTS 
Once we have found the finite automaton that summarizes 
the abstract states and processing steps of the information 
fusion process we are in the position to analyse trust and 
competence factors related to the various actors and 
stakeholders that are involved in the process. 
 
    The finite automaton is useful for the trust and competence 
analysis since the states refers to information which we will 
have to trust some actor to safeguard and make use of. The 
transitions of the finite automaton are the key processing steps 
for which we need to find actors that are competent to perform 
the steps. Therefor we will now describe a process for 
handling trust and competence constraints that is based on the 
finite automaton view of the problem and the solution space. 
The finite automaton in Figure 5 which is based on the 
sensitivity descriptor {[DB1, DB2]} will serve as a running 
example for this section. The analysis phases are as follows. 
 
     Firstly, identify the finite automaton states that are 
sensitive. In Figure 5 those states are marked with red color. 
The start state is not marked as sensitive since it is a 
prerequisite that a database owner has access to the sensitive 
data in the owned database. The fused database DB1+2 and the 
fused classifier C1+2 are marked since they contain the 
sensitive correlations between the component databases. The 
state [C1, C2] might also be sensitive since the two different 
actors that have access to each of the component classifiers 
jointly and deceitfully could get access to the sensitive 
information. The states marked with a prime do only contain 
filtered information and are thus not sensitive. 
 
       Secondly, for each sensitive state list the actors that can 
be trusted with the information referenced by the state. For the 
state DB1+2 of Figure 5 we assume that actors A1,  A2 and A3 
are trusted. Sensitive states that have no related trusted actors 
are removed from the finite automaton schema. 
 
      Thirdly, for each remaining sensitive state, for each trusted 
actor related to the state and for each action linked to the state 
investigate if the actor is competent to perform the action. The 
resulted is summarized in a competence table related to each 
sensitive state. Next to the state DB1+2 of Figure 5 we 
exemplify a competence table where T means that the actor is 
competent to perform the action and F means the opposite. 
Transitions that have no related trusted and competent actor 
are removed from the finite automaton and from the 
competence table. Hence we should remove action B from the 
state DB1+2   in Figure 5. The output this far is the trust and 
competence constrained finite automata. 
 
      Fourthly, extract the accepted language from the trust and 
competence finite automata. This will be the set of all feasible 
processing options. 
[DB1, DB2] DB1+2
C1+2C´1+2
E
F
E
B2
DB´1+2[C1, C2]
B B
F
Actions/Actors A1 A2 A3
E T F T
B F F F
 
Figure 5 - Example of how to apply actor trust and competence 
constraint to a finite automaton. Sensitive data combinations are 
symbolized by nodes marked with red colour. 
VI. PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER 
The overall procedure for analyzing and finding a solution 
in a situation that involves fusing information in databases 
containing restricted information is as follows. 
1) Define the sensitivity descriptor according to the 
procedure in section IV.C. 
2) Define the set of applicable filtering schemas according 
to section IV.B and express this set as a finite automaton as 
described in section IV.D. 
3) Analyse trust and competence constraints according to 
section V. This will result in a constrained finite automata that 
defines all feasible information processing solutions. The set 
of process descriptions that are in the allowed language of 
any of the constrained finite automata are in the feasible set of 
processes. 
4) Select one of the feasible process descriptions as the 
preferred  solution based on judgments including  ethical, 
political, economical and other real-world factors not 
included in steps 1-3. And of course optimization of the fusion 
process 
 
The steps above ensure that the sensitivity/security aspects 
of the fusion process are taken care of. Of course, we also 
need to ensure that the fusion process is efficient so that the 
situational picture produced is accurate enough. This process 
consists of the following steps: 
 
1. define a space of all allowed fusion processes 
2. search this space using the sensitivity criterion as a 
constraint on allowed processes/structures and with a 
normal evaluation criterion for the efficienty and 
accuracy of the fusion process. 
 
As an example, assume that we have a measure of 
efficiency of the fusion process. This could be the distance to 
the best classifier for the problem, or a comparison to ground 
truth for a general situation assessment system. For many 
problems, the users are not interested in the ideal solution – 
e.g., customs and police might only be interested in knowing if 
there is a higher than 80% likelihood that a passenger is a 
terrorist. 
 
    Let F(K, ʌ) be a fusion process where K is classifier and π is 
problem. Also assume that there is a risk functional R(K;A) 
where A ={D, V, Ȥ} and D is antagonist’s other available data, 
V is  goals and purpose of the antagonist, χ is the loss or 
damage caused by the antagonist knowing the sensitive 
information. 
 
     We learn the classifier K from data. K = K(data, machine 
learning algorithm, structure S). By using different structures S 
(including also the filtering rectangles), we get different 
classifiers K. 
 
      Now plot Risk versus F in a diagram. Two possible 
problem formulations: we are interested in getting the best 
possible F given that R is less than R*; we are interested in 
getting a K with at least efficiency F* and want the risk R to 
be as low as possible given F(K) > F*. 
 
      This optimization could also be formulated as search in a 
fitness landscape – where the ethical requirements prevent us 
from accessing parts of the landscape. Compare to linear 
programming where we want to find the best K that lies on the 
boundary separating allowed structures from dis-allowed. 
 
VII. EXAMPLE 
In this example, we have two databases, use support vector 
machines (SVM) as classifiers and make several simplifying 
assumptions that will be introduced as needed. Each record in 
both of the databases consists of a two-dimensional input 
vector x with real-valued elements and a binary label. The two 
databases have the same input vector in the same record but 
with different labels. The i:th records of database DB1 and DB2 
are hence [yi, xi] and  [zi, xi] respectively where the input 
vector xi is the same in both records.  
 
According to the first analysis step of section IV we 
generate the full spectrum of possible sensitive relations as the 
resulting language of the appropriate context sensitive 
grammar (see subsection IV.C where the relevant sensitivity 
relations are listed as an example). Furthermore we ponder the 
nature of the data and possible attack scenarios with the result 
that the appropriate sensitivity descriptor is selected to be S = 
{[DB1, DB2]} meaning that the sensitivity of the information is 
related to correlations between data in both of the databases.  
 
      In the second step of section IV we summarize the filtering 
schemas (see subsection IV.B and IV.D) that in principle 
could remove the sensitive information as a finite automaton 
(see subsection IV.D). Figure 6 displays the output of this 
step. 
 
      The third step of section IV introduces trust and 
competence constraints with a result that is showed in Figure 
5. We conclude that the feasible options are represented by the 
filtering schemas B◦E◦F and E◦F◦(B×B). 
 
       In the fourth step of section IV we judge that the most 
economical solution based on the capacity and cost profile of 
the involved organizations is the filtering schema E◦F◦(B×B) 
where each data owner first builds a support vector machine 
classifier and subsequently one of the organizations fuse and 
filter the classifiers.  
 
       Specializing the abstract filtering schema to our specific 
example with binary data and support vector machines, we 
start by building two binary SVM trained to classify y and z 
respectively. The two leftmost upper panels of Figure 6 show 
the data and the two leftmost lower panels show the resulting 
support vectors. Fusing the SVM means that the combined 
classifier forwards the test vector to each component SVM and 
outputs the combined results, namely y and z.  
 
      Assume now that that the existence of a region where 
y,z=1,1 is the sensitive fact that we want to filter out (see the 
upper rightmost panel of Figure 6. There are several options 
for filtering. If the application allows us to make a black-box 
classifier we could just add some post processing logic after 
the dual SVM for example by outputting and y,z=0,1 if the 
result of the SVMs is and y,z =1,1. If we must produce a 
white-box classifier we could edit the support vectors of the 
component SVMs in our example according to the following 
procedure. 
 
x1
x2
x1
x2
x1
x2
y=1 z=1 1,1 0,11,0
DB1 DB2 DB1 and DB2
x1
x2
x1
x2
y=1 z=1
Support vectors after filtering
x2
0,11,0
Support vectors before filtering
 
Figure 6 - Example of EƕFƕ(B×B)  processing for a two-
dimensional input vectors and binary labels. The upper left and 
middle panels show the domains where y=1 and z=1 respectively. 
The upper right panel shows the fused database with domains 
y,z=1,0, y,z=1,1 and y,z=0,1 respectively. We assume that the 
existence of a y,z=1,1 is the sensitive fact. The lower left panel and 
middle panels shows the support vectors (stars) before filtering and 
the lower right panel shows the filtered support vectors. 
      For each support vector in the y-classifier that classifies as 
z=1 move it for a distance δ in opposite direction of the 
gradient of the classification function of the z-classifier. 
Repeat until all support vectors of the y-classifier is classified 
as z=0 by the z-classifier. This simple algorithm assumes a 
problem geometry as in Figure 6 and uses the fact that the 
initial support vectors ideally is on the convex hull of the y=1 
domain. The resulting filtered support vectors are showed in 
the rightmost lower panel of Figure 6. After manipulating the 
support vectors we also need to adapt the SVM weights to the 
new support vector configuration. Since we lack access to the 
training data, this can be done by using the support vectors as 
training samples when retraining the weights. The fused and 
filtered classifier is now ready for certification. 
 
VIII. DISCUSSION 
In this paper, we discussed a method for weakening a 
classifier or fusion model so that it is not possible to use it to 
reveal sensitive or restricted information. This is important 
when fusing information from several data sources with 
different classification levels. The method also has 
applications in civilian security, where it for integrity and 
privacy reasons is necessary to ensure that a user of a classifier 
cannot use the classifier to reveal sensitive information about 
citizens.  
 
    Using a fusion method that allows accurate fusion of 
restricted information is very important in setting where 
compartmentalization of information is important. A drawback 
of normal fusion methods and the desire to go from “need to 
know” to “need to share” is that it enables a single infiltrator 
to potentially reveal all the classified information that is used 
to construct situation assessment. By moving to a paradigm 
where fusion models are constructed so that they cannot be 
used to reveal sensitive information, while still ensuring that 
they are strong enough so that they are useful, this problem 
could be solved. 
 
      In this paper, we took only a few first steps towards 
defining such a fusion process.  We suggested a method for 
formalizing the sensitivity constraints of data sources and 
suggested a method for generating permitted fusion processed 
as strings in a language generated by a finite automaton.  
 
     In future work, we aim to test the method on traditional 
fusion data and extend the fusion process modelling method 
introduced to general distributed fusion processes. 
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